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The general enjoyed his breakfast while reading his morning paper and listening to the international news channel. Hearing the Balkans mentioned-his area of responsibility-he looked up as a foreign correspondent began to comment on the aftermath of an Allied bombing mission from the day before. The gruesome details suddenly made the general's scrambled eggs a bit less appealing. The graphic pictures showed what appeared to be the remnants of an orphanage. There in the rubble lay a bloodstained, tattered doll. Those images left him wondering about the carnage that lay beneath the collapsed brick and mortar. Had his staff miscalculated and inadvertently struck an orphanage? A similar misstep had occurred a few weeks ago when another bombing mission resulted in civilian casualties in a marketplace. As the general bemoaned the potential ramifications of accidentally bombing an orphanage, a memory surfaced. Years of flying high-performance aircraft had sharpened his senses, and something about the scene seemed familiar. Could that be the same bloodstained doll he had seen in photographs of the earlier marketplace mishap? The general had been briefed on the enemy's rather low-tech yet successful use of deception. Was he, along with the rest of the world, a target of military deception? As he pondered this, his pager went off.
This fictitious example illustrates both how easy it is to manipulate the media in deception operations and how a thorough understanding of deception can help prevent a military leader from falling victim to it. The U.S. military is transforming itself with technological advancements in warfighting capability. Weapon systems, force structure and training have all improved. The amount and kind of information available to the warfighter is also improving.
But even a technologically advanced nation like the United States is susceptible to deception. Analysis of friendly and enemy deception techniques in Operations DESERT STORM and ALLIED FORCE shows the main U.S.vulnerabilities to include its insatiable appetite for "news," the lack of deception-detection expertise in the military, and the tendency to believe that technological advancements make a nation deception-proof. Therefore, the key to mitigating the U.S. vulnerabilities to deception lies in educating the media about the military and common deception practices, giving the military intensive deception-detection training, and abandoning the notion that technological advancement inoculates against deception.
Background on Military Deception
"Military deception" is an umbrella term that includes both denial and deception. Denial hides the real and deception shows the fake. Denial and deception are operations; propaganda and disinformation are the products (DOD Background Briefing:3).
Joint doctrine says that military deception, as applied by a joint force commander (JFC), targets an adversary's decision-making process. Ultimately, the intent is to shape the adversary's behavior in the JFC's favor or to cause an adversary to form an inaccurate impression of the battlespace. Consequently, planning for deception operations depends on intelligence and security for success. Obviously, a commander wants to conceal deception efforts from the enemy, but often he'll conceal all or some of his efforts from his own troops to prevent confusion and/or compromise of the plan (JP 3-13:II-4). During the early years of Soviet involvement in World War II, mishandling of information by soldiers and planners resulted in the compromise of many maskirovka (or deception) operations. As a result, the Soviets implemented aggressive security measures to protect their deception plans. Specifically, Soviet commanders restricted the number of planners and documents involved in the deception operations and communicated to subordinates only what they needed to know, when they needed to know it (Latimer:66) .
Put another way, deception occurs when someone manipulates perception. It is much easier to manipulate than to change, and it is easier to play on an existing fear or concern than to create a new fear or concern. Human nature responds to a situation by placing it in the context of a previous experience. The more experiences people have, the more "templates" or contexts they use to respond to new situations. These templates are defined by an individual's education level, cultural norm, social environment, economic status, etc. This is why deception must always be aimed at the mind of the enemy commander, or at the one who makes the decisions. That person can be a head of state, a commanding officer or an ordinary soldier .
To effectively employ the art of deception, the deceiver must know and understand the mind of the enemy. Good intelligence becomes the cornerstone of a successful military deception operation. To understand the value added that intelligence brings to the deception planning process, it is important to understand the difference between information and intelligence.
Information is merely fact. For example, a satellite image may reveal that an enemy has obtained a new weapon system. That information becomes valuable intelligence when it has been vetted through the intelligence process. The intelligence process takes facts or information and analyzes them, corroborates with many other sources of information to avoid bias, and scrutinizes the significance of the fact in order to create intelligence (JP 2-0:II-2). In the example of the enemy's recent acquisition, through analysis, corroboration and scrutiny, intelligence may reveal that the weapon may offer the enemy potential advanced capability, but without requisite support equipment, sufficient infrastructure (supply, maintenance, and logistics) and a robust training program, the weapon system doesn't improve capability in the near term.
This illustrates that the distinction between information and intelligence is important, because deception often manifests itself in the form of false or uncorroborated information. If decision makers don't vet information through the intelligence process, they may become dangerously vulnerable to deception .
Deception and Operation DESERT STORM
A helpful way to understand the concepts supporting denial and deception is to study their use in past conflicts. Operations DESERT STORM and ALLIED FORCE offer many examples of how the United States effectively employed deception. During DESERT STORM, U.S. and Coalition forces developed a robust and effective deception campaign that contributed to the successful outcome of the war. As many know, the "Hail Mary" or "Left Hook" maneuver used to go around the Iraqi flank was the method chosen to defeat the Iraqis. Successful deception and the preservation of the carefully combined element of surprise and security contributed to the resounding success of that maneuver.
Coalition deception efforts depended on three things. First, the Coalition was wary of the amount of civilian traffic in and around the border area. Of particular concern were the Bedouins, who were often Iraqi agents. War planners were also concerned about Western journalists in the border region, even though their movements were carefully controlled. So, for planning purposes, the Coalition could not assume troop movements and locations were secret from the Iraqis. Second, the Coalition had to convince the Iraqis it did not plan a flanking maneuver.
Fortunately, the Iraqis convinced themselves that any Coalition force advancing into the desert would promptly get lost and pose no threat to Iraqi positions. Interestingly, the Iraqis themselves had no operational experience in the desert. In fact, they usually resided in the river valleys of the country and considered the desert a very dangerous place. While aware that the Americans possessed the global positioning system (GPS), they had no idea of the extent to which GPS would revolutionize desert navigation. And finally, the Coalition had to be able to move 100,000 troops and 20,000 vehicles from the Gulf hundreds of miles inland for the flanking maneuver.
This was the key to making the Hail Mary maneuver work (Dunnigan:319-321).
Another important part of this deception effort involved the Marines afloat in the Gulf.
The amphibious deception started shortly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 when 2,500 Marines sailed for the Mediterranean on the amphibious assault ship USS Inchon. By mid-August, a 15,000-member Marine Expeditionary Brigade aboard 13 different ships in the Gulf started receiving a lot of press. By mid-January 1991, the Coalition was engaged in a variety of military operations designed to lead Saddam Hussein to believe that a major amphibious landing in Kuwait was certain. Air strikes against coastal targets, attacks on Iraqi war ships in Kuwait's waters and amphibious exercises were some of the largest since Korea (Latimer:300). As a result, Iraq positioned five troops on the Kuwaiti coast for every Marine afloat. Then to make sure the Iraqis remained on the beach, Coalition forces-in the early hours of the ground war-advanced north from Saudi Arabia and moved in behind the Iraqis. The Iraqi commitment of forces to the beaches to counter an amphibious landing that never occurred proves that the deception operation worked (Dunnigan:322).
One critical deception operation that allowed the Coalition to reposition forces for the Hail Mary maneuver was clandestinely known as Task Force Troy. This 460-member operation created a "ghost" division with five tanks, several wheeled vehicles, and elements of the U.S. The Serbs' success in employing the deception techniques detailed here was enhanced to some extent by NATO's self-imposed limitations regarding ROE and bombing altitudes. NATO aircraft were restricted to airspace at or above 15,000 feet (Cook:2). That restriction may have indirectly attributed to some of the success of the decoy targets set out by the Serbs. Pilot debriefings and gun camera video did not furnish the necessary detail that might have been obtained if the missions were flown at lower altitudes, for example, identification of secondary explosions on targets. The inability to determine secondary explosions probably left intelligence analysts guessing until national overhead systems captured BDA information. In the end, it is difficult to determine the full extent of the deception, because NATO didn't put a ground force in the area of operations until after the hostilities had ceased.
Recommendations and Conclusions
As seen in both Operations DESERT STORM and ALLIED FORCE, the United States is clearly capable of both deception and being deceived. In fact, the United States unwittingly aids enemy deception because of three specific vulnerabilities. Separately, they appear manageable;
however, combined they degrade U.S. ability to detect and overcome deception.
The first vulnerability is the United States' seemingly insatiable appetite for electronic media. Specifically, this country loves its all-news television networks and Internet access.
These media give adversaries direct access to the hearts and minds of U.S. citizens, leaders, and Perhaps the solutions mentioned will also help the U.S. military abandon the idea that it is more impervious to deception the more advanced it becomes. Without a doubt, the answer lies in studying the past. The Greeks were considered inferior to the Trojans over 3,000 years ago, yet a crafty deception operation involving a fake retreat, an informant, and a big wooden horse turned the tide, allowing the Greeks to realize victory (Dunnigan:32-34).
The Trojan horse should serve as this country's reminder that even the greatest nations can be defeated with deception. A look at Operation DESERT STORM revealed how a warhardened country like Iraq fell victim to it. Operation ALLIED FORCE showed how the United
States was duped by the Serbs' deception efforts. Strengths quickly become weaknesses without critical evaluation of vulnerabilities. The United States has unprecedented access to information, it dedicates billions of dollars to honing its awesome warfighting capability, and it leads the world in technological advancements. It does not adequately focus attention or resources to defeating the age-old weapon of war: deception. If the nation can teach the media to scrutinize the obvious, understand the military and appreciate the nuances of deception, it may become less vulnerable to deception. The United States could further mitigate its vulnerability to deception if the military's rank and file actively trained to understand, recognize and counter deception efforts. If this country can break the association between technological advancement and invincibility to deception, it has a fighting chance against future deception operations.
As the general got up from his breakfast to respond to his pager, he knew it would not be good news. Thousands of viewers awoke to the pictures of the bloody doll. A crisis was unfolding that demanded his immediate attention. As he walked alone down the long hall to the command center, the general focused like a laser on how he could reduce his command's vulnerability to the enemy's deception tactics. He knew that if he helped educate the reporters and his planners, then maybe he would be less vulnerable to deception-and maybe his pager would go off less frequently.
